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We present an analysis of markets with many asymmetrically positioned retailers that compete for
the business of both informed and uninformed customers for a homogenous good, such as software,
music, book or a brand-name appliance. We show that two forms of asymmetry, one related to loyal
segment sizes of retailers and one related to the positioning of firms, completely explain the observed
price dispersion in such markets and the multitude of asymmetrical strategies adopted by retailers.
The stochastic dominance of empirical mixed strategy measures is used to test the theory with data
on 968 books from 10 online retailers.
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A new perspective on oligopolies, introduced by electronic commerce, gave rise to the
prediction that availability of price comparison agents combined with low entry barriers in0167-7187/$ -
doi:10.1016/j.
* Correspon
E-mail addInternational Journal of Industrial Organizationsee front matter D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
ijindorg.2005.02.003
ding author. Tel.: +90 216 483 9674; fax: +90 216 483 9699.
resses: kocas@sabanciuniv.edu (C. Kocas), kiyaktun@msu.edu (T. Kiyak).
C. Kocas, T. Kiyak / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 24 (2006) 83–10584online markets would result in a Bertrand type competition. As customers comparison-
shopped for almost identical goods online, firms would have to cut prices one after another
to attract customers. However, online markets of today do not behave as predicted. A
dispersion of prices is apparent even for identical products. In this paper we demonstrate
that two forms of asymmetry, one related to loyal segment sizes of retailers and one related
to the positioning of firms (differentiation), completely explain the observed price
dispersion in online markets and the multitude of asymmetrical strategies adopted by
retailers.
A recent stream of empirical research on Internet markets reveals the existence of price
dispersion in the context of shopping agents that facilitate price comparisons (e.g., Clay et
al., 2001, 2002; Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001; Clemons et al., 2002). However, previous
research on the observed price dispersion at most provides a partial explanation to the
phenomenon. While differentiation is suggested to cause the observed price dispersion, no
complete explanation exists as to how the forces of Bertrand competition and the desire to
differentiate resolve into a market equilibrium. Capturing the promotional incentives of
many asymmetrical retailers, our research attempts to provide a theoretical operational
explanation to this observed price dispersion in these markets.
To provide this operational explanation, we focus on the asymmetry between the many
retailers in a given market. In the online markets for commodities like software, music,
movies and books, many firms offer identical products to their customers. When
customers compare prices of a homogenous product across retailers, these retailers are in
direct competition for the business of that customer. Internet shopping agents further
facilitate this price comparison behavior and can increase the competition in a market
considerably. Even for small ticket items, the benefits of comparing retailer offerings can
exceed the costs. Moreover, low entry barriers allow hundreds of retailers to get listed on
the results pages of Internet shopping agents and therefore rise into the consumers’
consideration sets. Consequently, in many online markets, Internet shopping agents
compare prices across a multitude of asymmetrical retailers and relay this information to
the price comparing customers on the demand side.
One would expect that the existence of a multitude of asymmetrically positioned
retailers would lead to at least several diverse pricing strategies. However, previous
theoretical research on homogenous goods markets focuses predominantly on a duality of
strategies, due primarily to the choice of duopoly as the market structure (Narasimhan,
1988; Raju et al., 1990; Rajiv et al., 2002). Even in Varian (1980), the analysis of an
oligopoly yields a unique strategy that all firms adopt, because all firms are assumed to be
symmetrical. However, a study of an Internet oligopoly with two types of firms reveals
that even symmetric firms may adopt asymmetric strategies (Iyer and Pazgal, 2003). We
believe a finer analysis of markets where a multitude of asymmetrically positioned retailers
develop a variety of strategies is warranted, especially given the rise of electronic
commerce and the Internet.
Consequently, for all online retailers that must compete in environments with
increasingly informed customers, a finer understanding of the nature of the competition
between many asymmetric retailers that sell commodities remains an important topic to be
explored. We hope to fill this gap by answering the following research questions: bHow do
firms compete on price for the business of switcher (informed) and loyal (uninformed)
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the customer can buy?Q, bWhat is the degree of promotional activity in these asymmetric
oligopolies?Q and bHow do firms differ in their promotional activity, including frequency
of promotions as well as depth of promotions, based on their customer base?Q
1.1. Brief overview
To address the research questions posed above, we consider a retail market with many
asymmetrically positioned retailers. We consider two forms of asymmetry. In the simplest
form, we define asymmetry as the diverse loyal segment sizes, a la Varian (1980) and
Narasimhan (1988). We use this definition of asymmetry in our base model. We also
define asymmetry in terms of the positioning retailers attain in the level of service,
convenience, warranty levels, reputation and store ambiance, akin to the differentiation in
Clemons et al. (2002) and Clay et al. (2002). This type of asymmetry (differentiation)
manifests itself as the price premium customers are willing to pay to buy the commodity
from the better-positioned retailer. Consequently, asymmetry in the level of service,
convenience and reputation may result in different reservation prices for the offerings of
different firms. As our model extension, we incorporate both of these asymmetries in our
analysis.
We refer to the customers who can compare prices of certain products across stores as
informed customers, or switchers as in Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Varian (1980) and
Narasimhan (1988). On the other hand, each retailer also enjoys the loyalty of a certain
segment of its customer base and can extract monopoly profits from these customers, who
remain uninformed about offerings from other retailers. We refer to these customers as the
loyal customers. However, since the targetability, the ability to predict if the customer is a
loyal or a switcher, as well as the addressability, the ability to contact customers
individually, is imperfect, retailers have no simple way of price discriminating (Chen et al.,
2001; Blattberg and Deighton, 1991).
Both economics and marketing literatures have rich research streams on pricing in an
imperfectly competitive environment. Tirole (1988) and Rao (1993) provide surveys of
pricing models in economics and marketing, respectively. The game theory-based research
streams in pricing in an imperfectly competitive environment seek equilibria in stylized
models of profit maximizing firms (Varian, 1980; Narasimhan, 1988; Lal, 1990; Raju et
al., 1990; Rajiv et al., 2002). Some key findings of the game theoretical models are that (i)
loyal and switcher segments and their sizes affect firms’ pricing strategies (Varian, 1980;
Narasimhan, 1988); (ii) brands stronger versus weaker in terms of brand/store loyalty and
brand/store positioning develop relatively diverse optimal pricing strategies. However, as
mentioned before, these studies do not consider markets with many asymmetrical firms.
We hope to extend these theoretical results to markets with many asymmetrically
positioned firms.
To theoretically and empirically analyze markets with a multitude of retailers affected
by comparison shopping, we build a stylized model of price competition in a market for a
homogenous good. Our analysis shows there are at least three diverse pricing strategies
and there can be as many discernable diverse strategies as the number of firms in the
market when there are many asymmetrically positioned retailers.
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price is homogenous across all customers. The retailer with the smallest loyal segment
adopts the first strategy and completely randomizes its prices along a continuum. The
retailer with the second smallest loyal segment adopts a strategy in which it also
randomizes its prices along the same continuum, yet also has the reservation price as a
regular price that it quotes frequently. The remaining firms with larger loyal segments
exhibit the third and final strategy. These retailers relinquish all price-based promotional
activity to the two firms with the smallest loyal segments and consistently quote the
reservation price.
When the reservation price varies across retailers, however, this final strategy
proliferates into numerous discernable diverse strategies with various resulting average
prices in line with the asymmetric positions of the retailers. Therefore, the retailers with
large loyal segments continue to abandon price promotions.
Our findings also provide an operational explanation for the observed price dispersion
that has received widespread research attention. Research streams in economics and
marketing have reported and attempted to explain the sources of dispersed prices where a
one-price rule was expected to apply (Salop and Stiglitz, 1977; Burdett and Judd, 1983;
Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Clay et al., 2001; Clemons et al., 2002). Our model shows
that asymmetrically positioned firms may engage in rivalrous behavior that results in a
variety of promotional patterns, which in turn lead to price dispersion. We offer empirical
evidence in support of these findings.
The most significant finding of our analysis pertains to the importance of building
loyalty in any market that can be distressed by price comparison shopping. Our analysis
shows that, especially in markets that lack entry barriers, price discounting is not a
profitable strategy. Those firms with the least to lose offer the deepest discounts to serve
the price comparing customers, making it unprofitable for other firms to even compete for
the business of switcher customers. Therefore, building loyalty, offering a higher level of
service and charging a premium for that service with higher reservation prices seem to be
the essential strategy on which to focus.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our model
and a model extension with the solutions to both. Then we provide empirical validation for
the basic predictions of the models. We further explore some aspects of our models and
their empirical validation in the Discussion section. We wrap up with the Conclusions
section.2. Model
Our model is a combination and extension of those by Varian (1980) and Narasimhan
(1988). These studies have examined two different supply-side structures; a symmetric
oligopoly was analyzed by Varian (1980) and an asymmetric duopoly was analyzed by
Narasimhan (1988). Introducing asymmetry into a market with a multitude of retailers, we
study an asymmetric oligopoly.
The assumptions and characteristics of our model are similar to those in Varian (1980)
and Narasimhan (1988). We assume a market for a homogenous good, such as a book, CD
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comparison shoppers (switchers). Each customer wishes to purchase a single unit of the
good. On the supply side of our model. there are kz3 firms: firm 1 through firm k. The
loyal customers are loyal to only one firm and we represent the number of customers who
are loyal to firm i as ni. Without loss of generality, we assume that ni Nni +1 for all i. The
comparison shoppers, s, (switchers) are not loyal to any firm and buy from the firm
offering the lowest prices. We normalize the market size to one without loss of generality
such that
P
ni + s =1.
Customers buy from any firm only if the price they are quoted is less than their
reservation price, r, which we assume to be homogenous for all customers and all
retailers.1 While the sizes of the segments ni and s and the reservation price r are common
knowledge, firms cannot engage in price discrimination because of imperfect address-
ability and targetability. All firms face cost functions with fixed and marginal costs that we
assume to be zero without any loss of generality. The profit functions of the firms are
given by:
pi pi; pið Þ ¼
pi ni þ sð Þ for pi ¼ min pj
 
pi ni þ s=vð Þ for piaM ¼ mjpm ¼ min pj
  
;N M½  ¼ v
pini for piNpj
8<
: ð1Þ
where pi represents the price quoted by firm i and p i represents the vector of prices
quoted by all other firms. As is evident from the profit function, we assume that, in the
event of a tie in prices, the firms in the market serve switchers equally. In the analysis that
follows, we first show there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in this game.
However, there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and we sketch this mixed
strategy equilibrium later in our analysis.
2.1. The analysis
As usual, we first define the upper and lower boundaries of firms’ supports. The upper
bound of the feasible price set is r. Prices higher than the reservation price will result in no
sales at all, while positive profits are possible when the reservation price is quoted. The
lowest price any firm will ever consider charging is given by pi
min=nir / (ni + s). To see
this, note that firm i can have a motivation to reduce its price down to a level where, if it
successfully captures all the switchers, it makes at least the same profit it would get from
selling only to its loyal customers at r. That is, (ni + s)pi
min=nir. Moreover, bigger loyal
segment size will mean higher potential loss in profit due to price reductions and,
consequently, the lowest price from which the firm can still benefit serving the switchers
will be higher for firms with larger loyal segments. Since ni Nni + 1, it follows that
pi
minNpmini +1. We first show the non-existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.1 We later relax this assumption by introducing an extension to this base model by allowing for different
reservation prices for diversely positioned retailers in the extension. This assumption can be relaxed further to
incorporate customers who are distributed over an interval with respect to their reservation prices. However, most
of the results are identical in analyses with fixed or distributed reservation prices. The simpler one is presented in
this paper for expositional ease.
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firms with asymmetrical loyal segment sizes.
Proof. See Appendix A. 5
While we provide the technical proof of the non-existence of Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies in Appendix A, we also provide an intuitive exposition here. Notice that the
motivation to undercut the price of other lower-priced firms to capture the switchers results
in a downward push in prices. Simultaneously, the motivation to increase the price to the
reservation price, if the switchers are not served with a lower price, pushes prices up. The
result is a lack of pure strategies. Next, we establish the equilibrium profits of all the firms.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium profits of all firms in this game will be equal to their
reservation utilities (minmax profits), which are the lowest profits that a firm i’s opponent
can hold it to by any choice of p-i (own prices) provided that firm i correctly foresees p-i
and plays a best response to it. The reservation utilities, or minmax profits are given by:
pmin maxi ¼ min
pi
max
pi
pi pi; pið Þ
	 

¼ nir for i ¼ 1; 2; 3; N ; k  1:
ni þ sð Þpmink1 for i ¼ k

ð2Þ
Proof. See Appendix A. 5
Having established the characteristics of the supports over the feasible range of prices,
we can solve the firms’ equilibrium pricing strategies. Any firm will serve its loyal
segment with the price it chooses as long as the price is below the reservation price and
any firm can capture the switcher segment if the price it quotes is lower than all the prices
quoted by the competing firms. Therefore, for any price p, except for any point where
firms may have mass points such as p = r, the equilibrium conditions for this pricing game
for k firms can be written as:
E pi½  ¼ nir ¼ nipþ
Y
jai
1 Fj pð Þ
 
ps for i ¼ 1; 2; 3; N ; k  1 ð3Þ
E pk½  ¼ nk þ sð Þpmink1 ¼ nkpþ
Y
ja1
1 Fj pð Þ
 
ps for k ð4Þ
where pmink 1Vp b r. The next proposition presents the uniqueness of some positions firms
hold in this game with many opponents and enable us to solve the set of equations we
presented.
Proposition 3. Only firm k and firm k1, the two firms with the smallest loyal segment
sizes and the two lowest pmin values, offer the deepest discounts.
Proof. We start our analysis in the left-most interval where only two firms can ever
compete, [ pmink 1, p
min
k 2]. In this interval, there are no pure strategy choices for firm k and
firm k1, but both firms have positive support. In this interval, both firms have lower
prices than the rest of the firms with probability 1 and so can capture the switcher segment
if they can price lower than the other. Firm k has an advantage; it can always price lower
than firm k1 with probability 1, if it prices just below pmink 1. However, it will not choose
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Thus, the two firms will randomize their prices in this interval so that their expected profits
will be equal to their minmax profits. We can write the equilibrium conditions for the
interval [ pmink 1, p
min
k 2] except for p
min
k 2 as:
pmin maxk1 ¼ nk1r ¼ nk1pþ 1 Fk pð Þ½ ps ð5Þ
pmin maxk ¼ nk þ sð Þpmink1 ¼ nk pþ 1 Fk1 pð Þ½ ps ð6Þ
where pmink 1Vp bp
min
k 2. Note that, in these equations, only the interaction with the other
firm is included in the formulation because all other firms have minimum feasible prices
above this interval’s upper limit. 5
The solutions to this set of equilibrium conditions are:
Fk pð Þ ¼ p nk1 þ sð Þ  rnk1
ps
ð7Þ
Fk1 pð Þ ¼ nk þ sð Þ  rnk1 þ p nk1 þ sð Þð Þ
ps nk1 þ sð Þ : ð8Þ
Note that with this solution Fk( p
min
k 1)=Fk 1( p
min
k 1)=0 as expected and the cumulative
probabilities with which firm k and firm k1 will price below pmink 2 are given by:
Fk p
min
k2
  ¼ 1 nk1
nk2
ð9Þ
Fk1 pmink2
  ¼ nk2  nk1ð Þ nk þ sð Þ
nk2 nk1 þ sð Þ : ð10Þ
Note that these cumulative functions represent the mass of prices already lower than the
prices of the remaining firms. In the next proposition, we explore how this competition
between the firms with the smallest loyal segment sizes extends to other intervals where
more firms can compete if they choose to.
Proposition 4. At most, two firms ever offer discounts or have support in any given
interval. Moreover, these two firms that may have positive support in any given interval
are the same two firms for all the intervals. These are the firms with the two lowest pmin
values and two smallest loyal segments: firm k and firm k1.
Proof. In Proposition 3, we have demonstrated that only firm k and firm k1 have
positive support up to the point pmink 2. Moving up from this point, we observe that, with
any price in the interval [ pmink 2, p
min
k 3], it is not only firm k and firm k1 but also firm
k2 that can increase its profits if it can successfully capture the switcher segment.
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this interval in this game. The lowest price firm k2 will ever quote is pmink 2 and, at this
price, the expected profit it will realize is given by:
pk2 pmink2
  ¼ nk2 pmink2 þ 1 Fk pmink2   1 Fk1 pmink2  pmink2s: ð11Þ
Yet, firm k2 will never price at pmink 2 if pk 2( pmink 2) is less than its minmax profit of
nk 2r. Inserting values from Eqs. (9) and (10) into Eq. (11), we see that the inequality
pk 2( p
min
k 2)bnk 2r simplifies to the inequality
r nk2  nk1ð Þs nk2 nk1 þ sð Þ þ nk2 nk þ sð Þð Þ
nk2 nk2 þ sð Þ nk1 þ sð Þ N0 ð12Þ
which is always true since nk 2Nnk 1. Therefore, firm k2 will never price at pmink 2
given that firm k and firm k1 are already competing for the switcher segment below
this price. Also note that, since it is only firm k and firm k1 that can compete at pmink 2
and possibly above as we have just shown, the cumulative distribution functions
presented by Eqs. (7) and (8) will also remain valid above pmink 2. In fact, we can solve for
the lowest price point above pmink 2 to which firm k2 will ever reduce its price by solving
the equation:
nk2r ¼ nk2pþ 1 Fk pð Þ½  1 Fk1 pð Þ½ ps ð13Þ
The only solution of this equation that is above pmink 2 is r. Hence, given that firm k and
firm k1 are already competing for the switcher segment below pmink 2, firm k2 will
never price in the interval [ pmink 2, r] but only at r. Moreover, since firms k3 to firm 1 are
no different than firm k2 in responding to the price competition between firm k and firm
k1, they will also not be competing in any interval but price strictly at r. So, in any given
interval, at most two firms will have support. They will be firm k and firm k1,
essentially because they are the two firms that can offer the deepest discounts to capture
the switcher segment. 5
2.2. Model results
Propositions 1–4 demonstrate that, in a market with many asymmetrically positioned
retailers, only those with the least to lose from deep price cuts will offer discounts. This
severe competition will force the rest of the firms to price at their reservation prices.
This is a striking result indeed. The frequency and depth of discounts firm k and firm
k1 offer in order to steal the switcher segment from one and other are so significant that
it does not pay for any other firm to even attempt to serve the switcher segment. That is,
the price competition between the two firms with the smallest loyal segment sizes is so
fierce that even the next firm with the smallest loyal segment size cannot successfully
reduce its price to capture the switcher segment profitably.
As we move on considering the firms with larger loyal segments, one by one, all firms
lose the competition for the business of the switchers segment against the ongoing
competition between the only two firms that can offer the deepest discounts. As a result,
only the two firms that have the least to lose by offering the deepest discounts will offer
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firms relinquish the price competition to the two firms that can profitably compete with
each other in this equilibrium. Solving Eqs. (3) and (4) accordingly, we derive the
probability distribution functions representing the equilibrium strategies of the firms.
fi pð Þ ¼
0 pbr
1 p ¼ r i ¼ 1; 2; N ; k  2
0 pNr
8<
:
fk1 pð Þ ¼
0 pbpmink1
rnk1 nk þ sð Þ
p2s nk1 þ sð Þ p
min
k1Vpbr
nk1  nk
nk þ s
p ¼ r
0 pNr
8>>>><
>>>:
fk pð Þ ¼
0 pb pmink1
rnk1
p2s
pmink1Vpbr
0 pzr
:
8><
>: ð14Þ
Eq. (14) demonstrates the three distinct promotional strategies that firms adopt in a
market with many asymmetrically positioned retailers. Firms with large loyal segment
sizes never promote in this market.2 Firm k always discounts and offers the deepest
discounts. This firm has the least to lose from promotional price cuts, due to a negligibly
small, or perhaps nonexistent, loyal segment size, and so can engage in almost irrational
price cuts to serve those informed customers who are willing to search for the lowest
available price. In between these two extremes is firm k1, which maintains a regular
price, r, with the purpose of maximizing its profits from its loyal customers but also
discounts as deep as firm k. Fig. 1 depicts the cumulative distribution functions that
represent the mixed strategies firms adopt.
2.3. An extension on the base model
The asymmetric positioning of the firms in our model has so far been a result of their
distinct loyal segment sizes. However, another indication of asymmetric positioning may
be the provision of different service levels, store ambiance, convenience and warranty
levels associated with different retailers (Rajiv et al., 2002; Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001).
The results of such provisions reveal themselves as price premiums that customers are
willing to pay to shop at a particular store.
To incorporate this type of asymmetric positioning, we expand our model by allowing
the reservation prices of the loyal customers to vary across stores. We represent the2 We would like to remind the reader that our model focuses only on regular products with stable reservation
prices. We recognize that retailers, small or large, typically have a variety of other reasons for price promotions,
including inventory clearance sales and using loss leaders for traffic generation. In addition, there are numerous
product categories, such as fashion items, where downward adjustments in reservation prices over time are a
routine practice. Our model does not extend to such promotions.
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
r p
F(p)
Fk(p) 
Fk-1(p) F1(p)F2(p)
 : 
Fk-2(p) 
Fig. 1. The cumulative price distribution functions of the firms.
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segment size and the reservation price of the customers since both of these variables would
depend on a multitude of other factors. However, for simplicity purposes, we assume
ri N ri+1.
3 We also assume that the reservation price of the switchers is given by
rs =min(ri)= rk.
Proposition 5. Even when the reservation prices are different, at most two firms will offer
discounts. These firms are again the firms with the two lowest pmin values. However, price
dispersion will be greater due to the heterogeneity of the reservation prices.
Proof. See Appendix A. 5
The proof is similar to the combined proofs of Propositions 3 and 4. The equilibrium
strategies will follow the distribution functions given by:
fi pð Þ ¼
0 pbri
1 p ¼ ri i ¼ 1; 2; N ; k  2
0 pNri
8<
:
fk1 pð Þ ¼
0 pbpmink1
rnk1 nk þ sð Þ
p2s nk1 þ sð Þ p
min
k1Vpbrk
0 rk Vpbrk1
nk1  nk
nk þ s p ¼ rk1
0 pNrk1
8>>>><
>>>>:
fk pð Þ ¼
0 pbpmink1
rnk1
p2s
pmink1Vpbrk
0 pzrk
:
8><
>: ð15Þ3 This assumption results in a simple model that captures the essence of our modeling effort. Depending on
various combinations of the loyal segment sizes and the reservation prices, numerous other equilibria exist that we
do not present here.
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
p
F(p) 
Fk(p)
Fk-1(p)
Fk-2(p)
rk rk-1 rk-2 rk-3 ….r1
Fk-3(p) 
F1 (p) 
Fig. 2. The cumulative price distribution functions of the firms when reservation prices vary across firms.
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distribution functions are depicted in Fig. 2. As these distributions show, because of the
heterogeneity of the reservation prices, the observed price dispersion will be even greater in
this market compared to a market with a homogenous reservation price across customers.3. Empirical validation
In this section, we use data from the online market for books to test our model
predictions. Books are uniquely identified by ISBN (International Standard Book
Numbering) numbers, which are widely used and recognized by customers as well as
sellers. For a through discussion of the online book market, see Clay et al. (2001). As such,
using books identified by ISBN numbers, we were able to make sure that we captured the
price competition for identical products across retailers. Our dataset consists of daily
prices, and net of shipping and handling for 968 books collected over a period of 6 months
(184 days) from 10 online book retailers.
3.1. Model predictions
Our models yield the pricing behavior of firms given asymmetrical loyal segment sizes
and varying reservation prices across firms. A retailer’s pricing strategy is represented by
the empirical distribution of the quoted prices, and hence we attempt to observe if such
data could follow from the firms’ predicted behavior in testing our model predictions.
According to our model results, we can hypothesize that:
H1. The lowest prices quoted by firms with the smallest loyal segment sizes will be less
than the lowest prices quoted by the remaining firms.
H2. The average prices of firms with the smallest loyal segment sizes will be less than the
average prices of the remaining firms.
H3. The frequency of promotional activity of firms with the smallest loyal segment sizes
will be greater than the frequency of promotional activity of the remaining firms.
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larger than the depth of promotional activity of the remaining firms.
Since summary statistics, such as the average prices and frequency and depth of
discounts, may fall short in completely characterizing price distributions, we also
hypothesize that stochastic dominance of price distributions will support our model
predictions.
H5. The cumulative distribution of prices for firms with smaller loyal segments will be
first order stochastically dominated by the cumulative price distribution of firms with
larger loyal segment sizes.
We describe our dataset and define our promotion, price and loyalty measures next.
3.2. Description of the dataset
Our model yields predictions on the firms’ promotional behavior based on the size of
their relative loyal customer segments, given there is also a switcher segment that is aware
of the prices these retailers quote. While one could list all the retailers that are selling the
homogenous good to incorporate in such a study, it is also crucial that the switcher
segment be aware of all available prices from all these retailers included in the list.
Otherwise, the competitive forces that are incorporated in our model would fail to be
operational.
To find such a market, in which not only the majority of the retailers selling the
homogenous good are identifiable, but also all are included in the comparison set of the
switcher segment, we turn to the online market for books. This market has many favorable
properties. In addition to enabling the daily collection of price information on many items
with little error, the online book market is also served by Internet shopping agents (price
comparison engines), tools that price comparing customers use to observe all the retailers
and their prices for a particular product.
While hundreds of online booksellers exist, we limit our study to the list of retailers that
the most popular price comparison engine identified as carrying a majority of the books
included in this study. With this method, we eliminated hundreds of marginal or specialized
online booksellers not significant for the study, while we retained the significant few that
serve the whole market. We utilized MySimon.com as the price comparison site for this
study, since during the course of the data collection period, MySimon was the leading price
comparison engine with an 80% market share in price comparison site visits with an
estimated 14 million unique visitors in a market with a potential size of 35 million
(Mediametrix and Nielsen Netratings; see also Allen and Wu, 2002; Kocas, 2002).44 Allen and Wu (2002) researched the reliability of data collected through bprice aggregatorsQ such as MySimon
and other price comparison sites, collecting data on 459 different books from eight price aggregators daily for 4
months. They conclude that MySimon covers the market best in terms of cross-sectional consistency as well as
longitudinal consistency and report that, if a single price aggregator were to be used, that it ought to be MySimon.
Since our research requires the coverage of a switcher segment that is informed about the retailer offerings
homogenously across the switchers, we were required to work with a single price aggregator and this study by
Allen and Wu (2002) confirms our choice.
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from various booklists publicly available on the Internet, mainly lists of books libraries
procured in 2001.5 The prices were collected over a period of 6 months, as a typical user of
the price comparison site would have observed them. A total of 44 retailers were identified
as a result of the price searches conducted for all 2207 books.
We preferred to use the portion of data on books that are not on the bestseller list, since
books on bestseller lists are more likely to go through reservation price adjustments in a
given time window, even over a relatively short period of time. Therefore, bestseller books
were removed from the dataset to minimize contamination due to reservation price
adjustments. Out of the initial 2207 books, after the elimination of bestsellers and
duplicates, we chose the 968 books that were carried by most of the retailers for the
majority of this time period. We also reduced the number of the retailers in our analysis by
including only those that carried the majority of the 968 books during our data collection
period. As a result, our final dataset consisted of the prices of 968 books that were carried
by 10 booksellers during a course of 184 consecutive days.
Normalizing the prices collected on each of the 968 books across retailers and
aggregating these normalized prices over all books and all dates yield enough data points
to reveal the possible pricing behavior of the retailers while minimizing data
contamination through reservation price adjustments.6 Price randomizations as mixed
pricing strategies are usually assumed to be executed through time and this behavior is
usually observed over multiple products (Narasimhan, 1988; Varian, 1980; Iyer and
Pazgal, 2003; Raju et al., 1990). Essentially, we use the distribution of prices, which are
aggregated over time and multiple products, as a proxy for the probability measure of a
mixed strategy.
3.3. Measuring loyalty
As discussed previously, our model yields predictions on the firms’ promotional
behavior based on the size of their relative loyal customer segments. We also assume that a
better positioning in terms of service levels, convenience and reputation translates into a
larger loyal segment size for the online booksellers. This assumption follows from the fact
that, given the immaturity of online markets, the reputation, size and service levels of
sellers are used as signals of trustworthiness and directly shape the size of the loyal
segments. Consequently, the online book market displays characteristics inherently
consistent with our model assumptions for both our base model as well as our expanded
model. We do not have loyalty data to allow us to sort the firms in our dataset by the size5 These sources were four booklists publicly available on the internet: (1) 140 books from Publisher’s Weekly
bestsellers list on 6-4-01; (2) 730 books from bOne Book List: Collaborative Books to ReadQ, a list compiled by
the Usenet newsgroup rec.arts.books; (3) 60 books from Latest Acquisitions by Government Environmental
Library 2001; and (4) 1277 books bought by Sidney Sussex University Library in 2001.
6 We normalize prices by dividing the price offered for any book by the highest price offered for that book by
any retailer over the 6-month period. The resulting empirical distributions are presented in Fig. 3. We also include
in the Discussion section a normalization by dividing a retailer’s price of a book by the highest price that retailer
offered for the book over the 6-month period. The empirical distributions based on this normalization are
presented in Fig. 4.
Table 1
Book link popularities used as a proxy for the loyal segment sizes for the retailers in the dataset
Retailer Referred to as Book link popularity
Amazon Firm 1 9,744,241
Barnes and Noble Firm 2 264,873
FatBrain Firm 3 24,463
1BookStreet Firm 4 13,150
Varsity Firm 5 9262
A1Books Firm 6 8343
eCampus Firm 7 3982
SamGoodys Firm 8 3348
AllDirect Firm 9 762
DoubleDiscount Firm 10 300
C. Kocas, T. Kiyak / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 24 (2006) 83–10596of their loyal segments. Therefore, we use book-related link popularity as a proxy
measure. Link popularity refers to the number of unique links across the Internet pointing
to a site. Book-related link popularity of a retailer, in turn, refers to the number of sites
with book-related content that links to a given retailer’s website. Link popularity is a
quantitative measure of the online awareness for a website and a primary determinant of
the traffic that a website generates, and therefore a good indicator of the number of
customers the website has.7 Noting that there are orders of magnitude of difference among
the link popularities of retailers in our dataset, we expect that the rank order with respect to
loyal segment sizes will be considerably similar to the rank order of book link popularity.
Therefore, lacking a better measure of loyal segment sizes for the retailers in our dataset,
we use link popularities as a proxy to rank these retailers with respect to their expected
loyal segment sizes. We label each retailer such that firm 1 is the retailer with the highest
link popularity, firm 2 is the retailer with the second-highest link popularity, etc., in
accordance with the naming convention we have used in our model. Table 1 provides the
link popularities and the labels assigned to the 10 retailers in our dataset.
Next, we present the empirical support and the discussions of the hypotheses.
3.4. Testing the hypothesis
To test 1–4, we compare the firm-specific pricing measures with the industry averages.
The pricing measures are the average minimum price, the average price deviation from the
ongoing price, the average discount and the number of price changes per book. We use t-
tests to compare each of these statistics with the industry averages and report the result in
Table 2.
Hypothesis 1 is that the average lowest prices (the average deepest discounts) are
offered by smaller firms. While the average prices along with their standard deviations
give us a sense of relative price levels as demonstrated in Table 2, the minimum prices
column also demonstrates that the average minimum prices of firms 7, 8, 9 and 10 are7 Reach of a website, defined as the number of users who visit a given site, also provides a proxy measure of
loyal customer segment sizes. The reach measure shows correlations close to unity with book link popularity,
suggesting that measures of traffic are closely correlated to measures of static links.
Table 2
Average prices and depth and frequency of promotions
Retailer Price levels Depth of promotions Frequency of promotions
Rank Name N Average minimum
price
Average price Deviation from the
ongoing price
Average discount
(1average price)
Number of price
changes per book
Instances highest
price quoted (%)
Firm 1 Amazon 951 0.767 (0.123) 0.787 (0.114) 0.035 (0.073) 0.213 (0.114) 0.512 (0.798) 13.13
Firm 2 B&N 967 0.793 (0.127) 0.827 (0.123) 0.045 (0.065) 0.173 (0.123) 1.213 (2.236) 16.94
Firm 3 FatBrain 968 0.798 (0.132) 0.824 (0.128) 0.035 (0.061) 0.176 (0.128) 0.672 (1.513) 18.41
Firm 4 1BookStreet 968 0.840 (0.133) 0.889 (0.115) 0.072* (0.079) 0.111 (0.115) 0.994 (0.963) 42.42
Firm 5 VarsityBooks 945 0.862 (0.144) 0.871 (0.141) 0.016 (0.039) 0.129 (0.141) 0.256 (0.501) 44.58
Firm 6 A1Books 968 0.715 (0.116) 0.722** 0.012 (0.039) 0.278** (0.113) 0.235 (0.548) 3.15
Firm 7 eCampus 968 0.665** (0.142) 0.711** (0.107) 0.032 (0.054) 0.289** (0.107) 4.471** (6.517) 0.06
Firm 8 SamGoodys 942 0.547** (0.230) 0.713** (0.124) 0.171* (0.199) 0.287** (0.124) 1.559 (1.064) 1.22
Firm 9 AllDirect 968 0.618** (0.098) 0.626** (0.097) 0.013 (0.044) 0.374** (0.097) 0.180 (0.414) 0.00
Firm 10 DoubleDiscount 968 0.545** (0.145) 0.636** (0.125) 0.052** (0.027) 0.364** (0.125) 22.306** (15.226) 0.09
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
Bold numbers are values higher or lower than the industry averages in the predicted directions.
* The difference from the industry average is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (one-sided).
** The difference from the industry average is statistically significant at the 0.001 level (one-sided).
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C. Kocas, T. Kiyak / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 24 (2006) 83–10598significantly lower than the industry average. This finding supports our claim that firms
with smaller loyal segment sizes have less to lose with deeper discounts and can offer
deeper discounts than the firms with larger loyal segment sizes.
For the purpose of validating Hypothesis 2, we need to demonstrate that the average
prices of the firms with the smallest loyal segment sizes are lower than the industry
average. Those averages that are significantly lower than the industry average are depicted
in bold in Table 2. As Hypothesis 2 predicts, we see that half of the firms, firms with
smaller loyal segment sizes, have lower average prices than the industry average.
Hypothesis 3 asserts that the frequency of promotional activity of firms with the
smallest loyal segment sizes will be greater than the frequency of promotional activity of
the remaining firms. We operationalize frequency of promotions as the number of changes
in the prices quoted for a book. Price changes are defined as differences in listed prices
from one date to the next date in the same store. Dates with missing prices are not
considered as price changes. Due to the nature of our data, any same-day price changes are
not accounted for.
As presented in Table 2, the results of the one sample t-tests show that two firms, firm 7
and firm 10, have changed the prices of their offerings more frequently than the average
frequency across all the retailers over the course of 6 months. These differences are both
significant at the 0.001 level. Similarly, all other eight firms have changed their prices less
frequently than the industry average.
We also tally the instances in which each firm quoted the maximum price in any day for
any book. As Table 2 shows, smaller firms had significantly less instances in which they
quoted the maximum price. In fact, firms 7, 9 and 10 each quote the highest price for a
book in less than 1% of the instances.
These results provide empirical support for our hypothesis that the frequency of
promotional activity of a few firms with the smaller loyal segment sizes are greater than
the frequency of promotional activity of the remaining firms.
To empirically validate Hypothesis 4, we need to establish what constitutes a
promotion. Our dataset shows that the most frequently quoted price of any book by a
firm is observed 99% of the time for almost all books and for all firms but firms 7 and 10.
However, this most frequently quoted price of any book by a firm is different for all firms.
That is, the dataset indicates the existence of a different reservation price for each firm. In
fact, this finding supports the structure of our model extension, in which we assume that
each firm has a different reservation price. However, with this assumption, a promotion
would be defined as a reduction in price from this firm-specific reservation price. We refer
to this definition of a promotion as a deviation from the ongoing price (first column under
depth of promotions).
On the other hand, if we assume that all customers have the same reservation price, we
see that a price promotion is defined as the deviation of the price from the maximum
quoted price, which is almost always the book’s MSRP (Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail
Price). Since this is the view taken by our base model, we refer to this definition of a
promotion as the discount on price for that book.
Also note that Hypothesis 4 applies to both of these definitions of a price promotion as
stated, that is, we expect the average discount (deviation from the overall maximum) as
well as the deviation from the ongoing price, to be deeper for smaller firms. In Table 2, we
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ongoing price is presented in the first column under depth of promotions and average
discount on price is presented in the second column. We observe from Table 2 that the
average discounts on price are significantly larger than the industry average for the firms
with smaller loyal segment sizes, while these discounts are significantly smaller than the
industry average for the firms with larger loyal segment sizes. As we calculate the changes
in normalized prices on a day-by-day basis, we observe the deviations from the ongoing
prices. That is, if we assume that each firm has a different reservation price for a book, we
observe the price promotions from this firm-specific reservation price. The result of this
analysis is also presented in Table 2. As presented, firms 4, 8 and 10 have significantly
deeper deviations from their firm-specific reservation prices than the industry average,
while all other firms have significantly less depth in their deviations than the industry
average.
These results provide empirical support for our hypothesis that the depth of
promotional activity of a few firms with the smaller loyal segment sizes are greater than
the depth of promotional activity of the remaining firms.
3.5. Stochastic dominance
Summary statistics, such as the mean and the standard deviations as we have used
above, may fall short in completely characterizing price distributions. To validate the effect
that the ranking of firms have on the level of promotional activity they engage in, we
borrow from the stochastic dominance literature. Stochastic dominance is fundamentally
used in comparisons of distributions to observe if one distribution offers generally lower or
higher values than the other. Stochastic dominance has been used in evaluating the
distribution of security returns (Hadar and Russell, 1969), in ranking income distributions
(Saposnik, 1981, 1983) and in ranking nutrition distributions of individuals (Kakwani,
1989). We use stochastic dominance to evaluate the relationship between rankings of firms
with respect to their loyal segment sizes and the promotional activities in which they
engage.
To see the overall relative distribution of prices, we use the most stringent dominance
criterion, first order stochastic dominance (Hadar and Russell, 1969; Saposnik, 1981). For
any two price distributions f1( p) and f2( p) with cumulative distribution functions F1( p)
and F2( p), if F1( p) lies nowhere above and at least somewhere below F2( p), that is
F1( p)VF2( p) for all p, then distribution f1( p) is said to display first order stochastic
dominance over distribution f2( p). Hence, in distribution f1( p), there are no more
observed prices, which are less than a given level than in distribution f2( p), for all levels of
prices.
To test Hypothesis 5, we compare the empirical cumulative price distribution functions
of the retailers used in our study. Hypothesis 5 asserts that price distributions of firms with
smaller loyal segments will be first order stochastically dominated by the price distribution
of firms with larger loyal segment sizes. Therefore, we expect to see that the cumulative
distribution functions of smaller firms lie above the distribution functions of larger firms in
our comparison. To this end, we present the cumulative distribution functions of the
normalized prices for the 10 firms in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. The comparison of cumulative normalized price distribution functions of retailers.
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promotional activity on a book for a given retailer, the maximum price ever quoted by any
retailer for that particular book is used for normalization and these normalized prices are
aggregated across all books separately for each retailer. Hence, each cumulative
distribution function depicted in Fig. 3 is made up of at least 116,000 observations on
prices from a particular retailer.
Fig. 3 provides empirical support for the predictions of Hypothesis 5 that cumulative
price distributions of firms with smaller loyal segments stay above the cumulative price
distributions of firms with larger loyal segments. Specifically, firm 10 and firm 9 have
distribution functions, which are strictly first order dominated by all firms but firm 7 and
firm 8.8 The chi-square statistic of 4.00 shows the prediction that the two smallest firms
being strictly dominated by all other 8 firms produces significantly better results ( p b0.05)
than by chance alone.9 These findings provide overall empirical support to our models,
showing that the promotional activity engaged in by smaller firms is more extensive then
the promotional activities of the larger firms.8 The deficit functions (the integral of the cumulative distribution functions) of firms 10 and 9 lie everywhere
above the deficit functions of all other firms, hence showing that firm 10 and firm 9 are second order
stochastically dominated by all the remaining firms.
9 Moreover, as a weaker comparison of small versus large firms, firms 10, 9, 8, 7 and 6 are strictly first order
dominated by firms 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1.
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Our objective in building and testing a model of price competition in an oligo-
polistic market with asymmetrically positioned firms was to provide theoretical and
empirical insight into markets in which price comparison shopping was possible. From
a theoretical point of view, our model demonstrates the existence of at least three
distinct pricing strategies, indicating the trade-offs different firms make to balance the
desire to serve the price comparing switcher segment and the desire to maximize the
profit from their loyal segments. Moreover, the three distinct strategies also provide a
theoretical explanation to the observed price dispersions in the homogenous goods
markets.
One theoretical finding that we would like to discuss further relates to the abandonment
of price promotions by the firms with larger loyal segments. As both our base model and
the model extension demonstrates, all but the two firms with the smallest loyal segment
sizes relinquish price promotions to the two firms with the least to lose from the deepest
price promotions. In order to observe if this is really the case, we present the cumulative
price distributions of all firms, where prices are normalized with respect to the maximum
price quoted per book by the retailer itself, a distribution which demonstrates just
deviations from the ongoing price. Hence, if a retailer has a price point at which it always
prices, that is lower than the maximum price quoted by some other retailer, that price
would be normalized to be 1 with this approach. Therefore, such a normalization would
reveal whether the majority of the firms relinquish competition to a few firms with the
deepest and most frequent discounts. We present these cumulative price distributions of
firms in Fig. 4.
As Fig. 4 demonstrates, all firms but firms 10, 8, 7 and 4 have almost no promotional
activity in terms of price cuts from their firm- and book-specific reservation prices.10 This
observation supports our model prediction that the majority of firms, especially those with
the larger loyal segment sizes, relinquish competition to the few firms with smaller loyal
segments and engage in almost no promotional activity.
Moreover, we also see that it is only firm 10 that has almost no mass point at the
reservation price, that is, firm 10 almost always offers price cuts. This behavior is also in
line with our model expectation that the firm with the smallest loyal segment size has no
mass point and always discounts. Meanwhile, we also observe that firms 8, 7 and 4 all
have varying levels of deep discounts and mass points at their specific reservation prices.11
To summarize, Fig. 4 exhibits pricing behavior very similar to that predicted by our model:
(i) the firm with the smallest loyal segment has all discounted prices; (ii) there are a few
firms with relatively small loyal segment sizes with discounted as well as non-discounted10 While firms 9 ,6, 5, 3, 2 and 1 seem to have at least some price randomization, we expect the true degree of
price randomization to be less than this observed level. The level of price variation is probably due to the
inclusion of systematic price shocks in our dataset that spans six months. A similar analysis with just 1 month of
the dataset reveals the amount of price promotions offered by these firms is much less than that observed from
Fig. 4, evidenced by almost zero price variations by these firms.
11 While our model expects only one firm to engage in such an activity, it is not unreasonable to think that
similar firms may form a pooling equilibria in which they collectively engage in a strategy, a la Varian (1980).
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reservation prices, having relinquished price promotion to the firms with smaller loyal
segments.5. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze price competition in markets where customers have the chance
to choose one retailer among many, such as the online markets for commodities. Our
model findings provide an operational explanation to the previous empirical evidence and
also lead to hypotheses that we empirically validate using data from the online market for
books.
Specifically, our model demonstrates that, among the many firms competing to sell a
homogenous product, a small number of firms with the least to lose will engage in price
promotions more actively than the remaining firms. The rest of the firms, with larger loyal
segments, will choose to price at higher and rather stable prices, where these prices are
determined by the reservation prices of their loyal customer segment based on the
positioning of the store.
Compared to symmetric oligopolies and asymmetric duopolies modeled in the
literature, our model is unique because it deals with an asymmetric oligopoly. Moreover,
compared to the literature, our paper is the first to consider multiple sources of asymmetry.
Our model extension provides an explanation to the observed price dispersion that has
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asymmetry in terms of loyal segment sizes determines whether a firm will price promote,
asymmetry in terms of positioning of the brand determines the level of price premium that
will correspond to the level of services and trustworthiness offered by the firm. Some key
findings of our analysis can be summarized as follows.
Asymmetry, not only in terms of different loyal segment sizes, but also in terms of the
positioning of firms, leads to a multiplicity of strategies.
The firms with the smallest loyal segments are responsible for almost all price
promotions, while the firms with larger loyal segment sizes do not price promote at all.
Firms that differentiate themselves with the level of services that they offer and charge a
premium for that differentiated positioning can coexist profitably with heavy promoters in
markets where information on prices is widely available and used.
The strategy adapted by the majority of firms that dictates the abandonment of price
promotions when smaller firms compete fiercely for switchers indicate the importance of
strategies to build loyalty in markets with low search costs, such as those mediated by
Internet shopping agents.
We consider this paper a unifying extension to models of price comparison by Varian
(1980) and Narasimhan (1988) and related empirical research (Clay et al., 2001; Smith and
Brynjolfsson, 2001; Clemons et al., 2002). However, we also recognize limitations of the
theoretical and empirical components of our research. For example, we intentionally omit
traffic-building concerns in our modeling effort and high-traffic items in our dataset. We
hope to include traffic issues in our future research. Also, having access to just some proxy
measure of overall loyal customer sizes, we could only distinguish large firms from
smaller firms. With detailed data on the loyal segment sizes, future research could
scrutinize the drivers of price promotions in further detail.Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us denote the jth lowest price as pj. Note though, some of
these quoted prices can be the same, and hence p1Vp2Vp3V . . .Vpk. Now, assume that
there is a strategy set, which is a pure Nash equilibrium. There are two possibilities: either
p1=p2, that is, the two lowest prices quoted are the same, or p1bp2, they are different.
Note that, if p1=p2=p3, the case is covered by the first possibility or, if p1bp2=p3 or
p1bp2bp3, the case is covered by the second possibility. Let us assume the first possibility
that the two prices are the same. Let us denote the two firms with these prices as firm z and
firm v so that pz=p
1=pv =p
2. Since this unique price point is higher than either pv
min or
pz
min, either firm z or firm v can undercut the price of its rival with an infinitesimal
reduction in price and capture the entire switcher segment and increase its profits, Hence,
there cannot be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium where p1=p2.
Now assume the second possibility, that p1bp2. Let us again denote the two firms
with these two lowest prices as firm z and firm v so that pz =p
1bpv =p
2. If
pz =p
1bpv =p
2b r, then firm v can increase its price to r and profit from this move,
because it sells to its loyal segment at a higher price. On the other hand, if
pz =p
1bpv =p
2= r, then firm z can increase its price while still serving the switchers
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strategy Nash equilibrium where p1bp2. 5
Proof of Proposition 2. To see that the equilibrium profits of these firms will be equal to
their minmax profits, note that all k firms have a loyal segment that will buy from them
regardless of the price as long as the price they quote is lower than or equal to the
reservation price. Hence, all firms can guarantee the profit nir by choosing to price at r.
However, in terms of undercutting all other firms and serving the switcher segment, only
one firm has an absolute advantage: firm k. Therefore, only firm k can improve its minmax
profit above nkr, by pricing at the minimum price any other firm can ever feasibly pull its
price back, pmink 1, which results in a minmax profit of (ni + s)p
min
k 1 for firm k. Also note
that (ni + s)p
min
k 1Nnkr, that is, firm k increases its profit by lowering its price to p
min
k 1
because by definition (ni + s)p
min
k =nkr and p
min
k 1Np
min
k , which implies that (ni+ s)
pmink 1Nnkr. Therefore, k1 firms with the largest loyal segment sizes will have the
reservation price within their supports in equilibrium and firm k will have the point pmink 1
in its support. Moreover, since playing the minmax response is within the mixed strategy
set of each firm, the equilibrium profits of each firm must equal their reservation
utilities.12 5
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is similar to the combined proofs of Propositions 3 and
4. Given ni Nni+1 and ri N ri+1, remembering that pi
min=niri / (ni + s), these two firms with
the lowest pmin values will once more be firm k and firm k1. That is, pmink bpmink 1bpmin i .
Since firm k and firm k1 again have the absolute advantage of pricing in the left-most
interval, they will compete in this interval with cumulative distribution functions identical
to those derived in the Proof of Proposition 3.
Moreover, moving up from point pmink 2, the increasing cumulative function values will
be deterrent to other firms. So, even when the reservation prices vary for firms, only firm k
and firm k1 have support over any interval. Given the competition between the two
firms that can pull their prices lowest, it does not pay for any other firm to compete with
them. Only firm k and firm k1 will randomize their prices while other firms will prefer to
remain at their respective reservation prices and serve their loyal segments. Additionally,
since rkb rk 1, there will be no support for any firm in the interval [rk, rk 1] and firm
k1 will have its mass, which equals to nk1nk
nkþs at its reservation price, rk 1. Moreover,
the remaining firms will not share the same regular price at which they always price. Each
firm will have a separate regular price, which is equal to its reservation price. 5
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